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 1 
Managing (in)security in Paris in Mai ’68 
 
 
‘la grande peur éprouvée par les tenants du pouvoir établi,  




Cet article prend appui sur le concept issu des Études critiques de sécurité (Critical Security Studies) de la 
gestion de l’(in)sécurité ainsi que sur les travaux de Peter Manning sur l’aspect théâtral de la police. Nous 
tentons une reconstruction de l’expérience affective des policiers et gendarmes mobiles, notamment de leur 
sentiment d’insécurité quand fut marqué une crise soudaine dans la co-opération traditionnelle entre les services 
d’ordre syndicaux et les forces de l’ordre dans la gestion des manifestations. Dans les rangs, la plupart des 
policiers et gendarmes vecurent Mai douloureusement et repondirent à la stratégie ‘attentiste’ officielle tant 
vantée par son auteur Maurice Grimaud par une insubordination sans précédent. Nous nous penchons également 
sur le rôle joué par le Service d’action civique (SAC), le service d’ordre gaulliste, en tant qu’auxiliaires violents 
et clandestins des forces de l’ordre. La savante diffusion pendant la toute dernière semaine de mai parmi 
l’ensemble de la population d’une manière de comprendre les manifestants que nous qualifions de “policière”, 
ainsi qu’une nouvelle gestion des manifestations qui permit à la population d’en avoir peur, ramena enfin la 
majorité silencieuse à réaffirmer haut et clair leur soutien du régime et de ses fonctionnaires.  
 
 
A boy was injured in a road traffic accident on his way to a respectable school in central Paris 
on 8th May 1968. The policeman tasked with informing the school was sufficiently troubled 
by what transpired when he got there to file a report: the headmaster ‘m’a accueilli assez 
froidement […] À ma sortie, traversant une cours [sic] j’ai été hué et sifflé et, ai fait l’objet 
de nombreux quolibets plus ou moins désagréables, de la part de quelques cinq cents élèves 
âgés d’environ 12 ans pour la plupart’ (PP FB 4).1 A policeman on a mercy mission greeted 
by a fellow fonctionnaire less than warmly before being jeered off the premises by an unruly 
crowd of five hundred twelve-year-olds: this microdrama, for all that it may seem comic, 
suggests something of the sudden sense of unease or insecurity which, I shall argue, for many 
members of les forces de l’ordre characterised their experience of Mai ’68. Peter Manning 
(2012: 178) suggests that ‘the police carry an authority that must be performed’, that they are 
tragic actors in ‘communicative dramas’ of social control (186), in which they ‘represent 
order’ (184) but, by virtue of being so visible in their performance, are also ‘vulnerable to 
tragic alternations in their status and respectability’ (175). In the headmaster’s office and 
crossing the courtyard, this policeman experienced just such a dramatic reversal. There is 
almost no explicit comment in the Paris police archives about how officers felt during Mai 
(Bordelais, 2011: 158-9), yet unease and indignation are palpable just below the surface. 
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Manning’s dramaturgical conception of policing has helped me to think through some 
of what was at stake in the policing of Mai and in the anti-police culture developed by 
protestors. Helpful too has been a defining insight of the (sub)discipline of Critical Security 
Studies, defining of its critical self-distancing from established Security Studies: that 
securitising processes are double-edged and inherently reversible. Thus ‘(in)security’ names a 
form of governmentality in which power is exercised by ‘professionals of the management of 
“unease”’, including the police, whose actions create security for some by withdrawing it 
from others, who determine who will be saved and who sacrificed (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008: 
2), whose interventions alternate anxiolysis with anxiogenesis, who effect social 
(re)distributions of safety and danger. The work police do, as security professionals in this 
sense, involves both inspiring fear and dispensing reassurance: (in)security governance. 
However, during May–June 1968 the police in their thousands become objects of (in)security 
governance: protestors aimed, largely successfully, in a manner consistent with Che 
Guevara’s doctrine of guerilla warfare, to create a climate of insecurity around their enemies. 
The police, in turn, found themselves hungry for reassurance: from government ministers, 
Préfet Maurice Grimaud, policing unions and ordinary citizens. The regime’s political victory 
depended, I shall argue, not only on shrewd management of officers’ feelings of insecurity 
but also, especially in the last week of May, on tactically astute (in)security governance of the 
wider population, who were encouraged by a more successful and insidious communications 
operation to adopt the police’s own divisive ways of knowing the protestors, and on 
managing protests in such a way that this ‘majorité silencieuse’ felt ‘la grande peur’ (Rajsfus, 
1998: 11), turning back for reassurance to the police and the state they represented. 
  Public order policing, wherever it takes place, is among the most theatrical of all 
forms of policing. Mass demonstrations create a risk situation for the police in which 
momentary reactions by individual officers, who are on show, can have unintended 
consequences of surprising magnitude, especially in Paris: as Grimaud was acutely aware, 
soldiers killing 35 demonstrators on 22 February 1848 precipitated the fall of Louis-
Philippe’s regime and the Paris municipal police opening fire on 6 February 1934, killing 14 
on the day and injuring a further 645, led to the fall of Daladier’s government (Grimaud, 
1977: 177-80; Bruneteaux, 1996: 24; Gordon, 2007: 105; Blanchard, 2015: 15, 16 n.1). The 
stabilisation of ‘la forme manifestante’ in its recognisable twentieth-century and 
contemporary guise, between 1880 and 1910 (Favre, 1990: 17), or 1920 (Bruneteaux, 1996: 
23), occurred in conjunction with the emergence of le service d’ordre as a distinct element 
within trade union and protest movements (Cardon and Heurtin, 1990) and the transfer of 
 3 
responsibility for policing demonstrations from the regular army to specialised units of a 
‘troisième force’ of public order specialists, ‘une police des foules’ (Bruneteaux, 1996: 27), 
with the founding of the Gendarmerie Mobile in 1921, followed by the CRS in 1944 and the 
Compagnies of the Paris municipal police in 1953 (Bruneteaux, 1996: 27; Fillieule, 2006: 
86).  
Legislation from 1935 further defined the contours of ‘la forme manifestante’: 
organisers were required to declare in advance, at the Préfecture or Mairie, the route and 
points of assembly and dispersal (Fillieule, 2006: 92). Olivier Fillieule notes that the police 
have invariably used this legislative framework (latterly toughened in the 1994 Code pénal) 
to open channels of negotiation with protest organisers, in person or over the telephone, 
characterised by: 
 
l’exercice de la persuasion, qui consiste à imposer aux organisateurs de manifestation 
des conduites présentées comme étant dans leur propre intérêt (mise en place d’un 
service d’ordre manifestant, par exemple) mais aussi, dans certains cas, à promettre 
des récompenses, à proposer des échanges de service; la manipulation, qui tend à 
modifier les perceptions de l’adversaire, de son environnement, et donc ses 
comportements (agitation de menaces réelles ou supposées – contre-manifestations, 
provocateurs, etc. –, invocation d’une capacité d’expertise pouvant amener les 
manifestants – surtout lorsqu’ils sont néophytes – à adopter le point de vue que la 
police cherche à faire prévaloir dans l’organisation et le déroulement du service.) 
(Fillieule, 2006: 89) 
 
In their dosing of fear and reassurance these negotiations are exemplary of the police 
exercising (in)security governance. The result has been that the vast majority of mass 
demonstrations organised in France since the mid-1930s have proceeded without violence, 
‘dans un esprit de connivence ou tout au moins de re-connaissance mutuelle’ (Fillieule, 1997: 
273). Extending Manning’s dramaturgical model, such demonstrations can accordingly be 
understood as collaborative ‘co-productions’ between organisers and police, wherein the 
advantage for the police is that members of le service d’ordre (hereafter SO) mounted by the 
demonstrators operate, in effect, as unpaid auxiliairies of the police, les forces de l’ordre.2 
The SO contains the demonstration by defining limits of acceptable behaviour (for example, 
by handing over ‘casseurs’ to the police) and by delineating the shape – the aesthetic form – 
of the official cortège, distinguishing it from the environing danger zone police term ‘la 
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nébuleuse’, the group of onlookers and – in terms of police knowledge – troublemakers who 
typically walk alongside the official procession: ‘la nébuleuse est au-delà du service d’ordre’ 
(Favre, 1990: 22). Collaboration between the police and the SOs of some trade unions – 
notably the CGT – has historically been very close: indeed, the relationship has been too cosy 
for the comfort of some activists (Rajsfus, 1996: 20; Dufresne, 2007: 225). One senior officer 
interviewed in the early 2000s by David Dufresne (2007: 119) remarked ‘Le SO de la CGT 
nous appelle même “collègues” parfois!’. A plain-clothes liaison officer recalled fondly in 
another interview the difficult dispersal of a CGT demonstration when ‘les anarchistes’ began 
attacking police: ‘avec vingt gros bras, on a tous ensemble cassé du casseur. Et je ne vous 
raconte pas. Eux, ils se servent de moyens que nous avons abandonnés depuis longtemps’ 
(Dufresne, 2007: 118). According to one radical account, however, faced with the rise in 
involvement over the last ten years of direct action anti-capitalist (‘black bloc’ and ‘cortège 
de tête’) groups in their demonstrations, the CGT’s SO has increasingly resisted co-operating 
as functional auxiliaries of the police, adopting instead a purely organisational and protective 
role (Comité invisible, 2017: 40).  
 Of course, much of the most disruptive protest in Mai occurred when demonstrations 
exceeded this legal and conventional collaborative framework as they developed into riots. 
Nevertheless, police tried hard to re-establish a negotiatory relationship with protest 
organisers and their SOs: on 7th May Grimaud had a direct line installed linking his office 
with SNESup headquarters (Joffrin, 2008: 108) and left-leaning senior officer André Gaveau 
managed to negotiate with UNEF before the Charléty demonstration and meeting on 27th 
May (Gaveau, 1978: 117; Grimaud, 1977: 265–68). In the intervening period, however, the 
relationship between police and these two relatively moderate unions underwent a 
lachrymose break-up. Late in the night after the ‘Longue Marche’ of 7th May had regained 
the Quartier latin, SNESup’s Alain Geismar was busy negotiating with Grimaud on the 
telephone hotline while UNEF’s SO gave the order to disperse to a reluctant crowd, some of 
whom were formed into smaller mobile commando units and led back into battle against the 
police by ‘pro-chinois’ factions (Joffrin, 2008: 111). One Commissaire reported that at 2am 
he was approached by four members of UNEF’s SO, ‘très émus (l’un d’eux pleurait même) 
complètement affolés et débordés par les évènements, qui ont tenu à me faire savoir que les 
manifestants irréductibles qui endommageaient les voitures et résistaient au service d’ordre 
par des jets de projectiles, n’appartenaient pas à leur organisation, mais à une organisation 
révolutionnaire pro-chinoise. Ils m’ont supplié de faire intervenir mes effectifs pour mettre un 
terme à leurs actes de vandalisme’ (PP FB 4; Joffrin, 2008: 112).3 There were more tears at a 
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debriefing meeting in La Halle aux vins the following day as Geismar realised how his 
leadership in dispersing protestors who were unwilling to disperse had been lauded in radio 
coverage (Joffrin, 2008: 117).     
The biggest of the protest demonstrations, which involved the CGT, notably the 
300,000-strong anti-celebration of the Fifth Republic’s tenth birthday on 13th May, were 
preceded by some of the prior negotiation that made the police’s job so much easier and 
stewarded by co-operative SOs. The most disruptive and violent protests, however, were 
those which lacked prior negotiation and in which the police lacked effective support from an 
auxiliary SO, either because it was unable to control extreme elements (as in the night of 7-
8th May), or because the SO was too small to have any influence over the mass of protestors 
(Sommier, 2008: 20; Cohn-Bendit, 1975: 38), or because the SO had itself turned against the 
police.4 The police often had little clue where the marches would go next, especially in the 
case of the ‘Longue Marche’ of some thirty kilometres, when demonstrators crossed to the 
Right Bank, breaching a significant symbolic limit. After the débâcle of premature dispersal 
in the early hours of 8th May, UNEF’s attempt to impose its SO on the 10th May 
demonstration was rejected by Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s faction: ‘j’étais debout sur un banc avec 
un mégaphone: “Il n’y a pas de service d’ordre. Chaque ligne est responsable. Vous êtes le 
service d’ordre.” Les gens étaient vraiment étonnés!’ (Cohn-Bendit, 1975: 38). This Mai 
intermission in the co-production of demonstrations by police and SOs gave rise to an 
enduring belief among gauchistes in their tonic effect on demonstrations as practised by trade 
unions and the PCF: 
 
Quelle différence avec les processions traîne-savates auxquelles nous ont habitué les 
bureaucraties ouvrières! Dans les cortèges du P.C. les gens sont passifs, mous, 
nonchalants. Ils vont manifester comme on va au cinéma, entre 6 et 8. Ils descendent 
dans la rue par tradition, parce que ça se fait encore. Aussi les manifestations ont-elles 
ce rituel fade et désuet des cérémonies auxquelles on ne croit plus. (Bensaïd and 
Weber, 1968: 124-5) 
 
In their latest book, le Comité invisible (2017) offers a strikingly similar, if somewhat more 
polemically phrased, reading of the effect of the emergence, over the last decade, of ‘black 
bloc’ and ‘cortège de tête’ groups on the ritual of the demonstration: 
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Quelques centaines de “jeunes” ont vu, dès les premières manifestations, que les corps 
syndicaux défilaient comme des zombies, qu’ils ne croyaient pas un mot des slogans 
qu’ils beuglaient, que leur service d’ordre matraquait les lycéens, qu’il n’y avait pas 
moyen de suivre ce grand cadavre, qu’il fallait donc à tout prix prendre la tête de la 
manifestation. (Comité invisible, 2017: 146)5 
 
In Mai, as in numerous protests in France over the last ten years, violence flourished in the 
breakdown of the cosy working relationship between the police and their interlocutors among 
the organisers and their SO, revealing in this very breakdown just how much the police 
usually rely on these functional auxiliaries. Cohn-Bendit would characterise Mai as a 
wholesale rejection of the very idea of a SO, as a masculinst, managerial and elitist product 
of simplistic oppositional thinking: ‘l’ennemi a une armée, il nous faut une armée’ (Cohn-
Bendit, 1975: 139). There was indeed a questioning of what could be called the pastoral-
managerial function of the traditional trade union SO in conducting the conduct of 
demonstrators, in shepherding and stewarding them, a questioning which overlaps, in the 
theoretical sublimate of Mai that is Jacques Rancière’s political thought, with an egalitarian 
critique of vanguardist elitism (Davis, 2010: 1–25). However, a more precise characterisation 
than Cohn-Bendit’s would underline that Mai did not involve a wholesale questioning of the 
SO but rather brought pressure to bear specifically on the customary function of the SO, as it 
had stabilised since first emergence in 1909 (Favre, 1990: 17), in behaving as an extrusion of 
the police apparatus. Yet such questioning did not imply pacification: if every protestor was 
indeed le service d’ordre, as Cohn-Bendit declared in his harangue, and if this generalised 
SO was conceived as functioning autonomously of the police rather than in collaboration 
with it, the way was opened in theory to precisely the kind of widespread offensive-defensive 
violence against the police which occurred in practice. The oppositional thinking involved in 
questioning the function of SOs in taming protest movements was sophisticated rather than 
simplistic, a substantial political dimension of the movement’s anti-police. To generalise a 
SO conceived as independent of the police implied generalising the SO’s autonomous 
exercise of force and making the entire movement militant: the transition from having an 
army to being an army. More than on the streets of the Quartier latin, such a transition was 
apparent in the factories which rank-and-file union workers occupied as a revolutionary 
army, holding their territory well into June before fighting pitched battles against invading 
CRS, at Peugeot–Sochaux on June 11th, where officers opened fire and two workers were 
killed (Mathieu, 2013: 165), by contrast with ‘le respect tacite de certaines limites’ by police 
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and students in central Paris, foremost among them that lethal force would not be used 
(Bensaïd and Weber, 1968: 67). Indeed, La Cause du peuple likened the battle fought by 
occupying workers at Sochaux to both the wartime French and contemporary Vietnamese 
armed Resistance (Buton, 2011: 70).    
 Grimaud realised that when les forces de l’ordre were drawn on to the streets in such 
numbers their task was far was more delicate and demanding than merely suppressing 
disorder. The police had become spectacle and they faced protestors whose tactics included 
taunting them in the hope of eliciting microdramas of repressive violence which could fuel 
further unrest: Grimaud’s instinct, in response, was to ‘dédramatiser’ (Grimaud, 1977: 73), to 
resist any escalation of the developing ‘psychodrame’ (238). The police presented a visual 
spectacle for protestors, onlookers, journalists, photographers and film-makers and also 
became, by their very presence, a dramatising focus for listeners’ attention on the radio news 
before such live broadcasting was banned on 23 May: ‘Cette radio dans la rue […] donnait un 
caractère extraordinairement dramatique aux moindres incidents, et l’information atteignait 
de plein fouet des centaines de millieurs d’auditeurs tendus vers leurs transistors’ (Grimaud, 
1977: 152). The live narration of police violence by journalists galvanised listening protestors 
and helped amplify skirmishes in the Quartier latin into a national drama (Gaveau, 1978: 67; 
Rudolph, 2008: 317; Zancarini-Fournel, 2016: 804–5). Under normal circumstances the 
police exercise control over what gets looked at or otherwise attended to, and how: Manning 
(2012: 187) argues that ‘Police produce punctuated and sharp meanings for vague, unclear, 
distant yet worrying events’. Yet in public order policing the police lose much of their control 
over the field of public attention, in which they are compelled to make an appearance 
themselves. Their performance must appear as calm, imperturbable, resilient and reasonable 
as the sovereignty of the state they represent. If they fall short and behave in an arbitrary or 
overtly vengeful fashion then their performance calls into question the state’s implicit claim 
to legitimacy in the exercise of its sovereignty. I contend that the premium placed by 
Grimaud on his officers exercising self-control, which has since become enshrined as the 
French doctrine of public order policing (Monjardet, 1990: 211; Bruneteaux, 1996: 26; 
Fillieule, 1997: 287), has to be understood in light of his awareness of the way in which the 
police’s performance represented the authority of the state to the wider population. 
Conversely, the anti-police tactic of provocation, functioned with some success to elicit 
precisely the sort of undignified performances which suggested that the state’s authority 
rested on little more than the brute force of its mercenaries. Grimaud’s determination to avoid 
lethal violence, and to minimise the use of gratuituous non-lethal violence, at least in the 
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public eye on the streets of Paris, was driven by acute awareness of how exposed his officers 
were to public scrutiny. 
Grimaud’s ‘tactique d’intervention lente et massive’, whereby units were built up into 
large formations before charging, was motivated by a concern for how the police appeared in 
the eyes of the wider population: it was intended to avoid situations in which officers would 
panic and open fire in self-defence (Grimaud, 1977: 99). However, because most of Mai’s 
demonstrations no longer followed routes which had been agreed in advance with the police 
and because allowing for resting staff he had only 8–10,000 officers on the ground in any 
twenty-four hour period (Mathieu, 2013: 148; Grimaud, 1977: 177), this invariably meant 
long waits of many hours by static units of officers on the ground as reinforcements arrived. 
One critic refers dismissively to Grimaud’s tactic as ‘attentisme’ (Rudolph, 2008: 316) and it 
was sorely resented by rank-and-file officers (Bruneteaux, 1996: 204; Forest, 2011: 168–9), I 
would argue because it exposed them to two distinguishable kinds of morale-sapping unease, 
or insecurity: practical-material and existential-professional.  
Bernard Deleplace, later leader of the left-leaning FASP policing union, claimed that 
there was widespread insubordination in response to the lack of refreshment during these 
long waits, one of a number of practical-material problems caused by Grimaud’s approach: 
officers started smoking, which was against regulations in such circumstances, and passing 
around snacks, also forbidden, in mock secrecy (Deleplace, 1987: 116). Official distribution 
of casse-croûtes to deployed officers did not begin until 15th May after policing unions 
brought pressure to bear on Grimaud, objecting that it was unreasonable to expect police to 
do fifteen-hour shifts without allowing them to eat or drink (Clémençon, 1999: 56). Yet nine 
days later one officer had to radio the Salle de Commandement to send sandwiches, beer and 
cigarettes to calm disaffected personnel (Gaveau, 1978: 105–6). The long waits also caused 
other practical problems: ‘Pour les toilettes, il fallait se débrouiller et trouver une concierge 
compréhensive’ (Clémençon, 1999: 56). Jean-Pierre Clémençon, whose unit of municipal 
police had been requisitioned from the northern suburb of Aubervilliers, recorded incidents of 
serious insubordination among his officers, ‘très marqués à gauche’, some of whom spoke of 
deserting their post and returning home without permission (Clémençon, 1999: 57). Thierry 
Forest, who commanded a GM unit, referred more guardedly to ‘l’extrême énervement des 
hommes sur le terrain’ on 10th May (Forest, 2011: 168).   
The existential-professional insecurity which Grimaud’s ‘attentisme’ caused in 
officers led to more violent acts of insubordination. Police were obliged to look on while 
protestors dug up streets to prepare stocks of pavés later to be launched against their 
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unwilling audience, or as they conveyed stones, metal bolts, Molotov cocktails and other 
projectiles up staircases to be launched on officers from above. All such actions could be 
understood, and were widely experienced, as provocations: as they are today, French police 
were trained according to the adage that ‘Force doit rester avec la loi’ (Roché, 2016: 87), in 
other words that they should control the situation; yet Grimaud and his commanders ordered 
them to stand by as witnesses to numerous acts of lawlessness. The sense of unease which 
this professional and existential self-contradiction provoked was unbearable for numerous 
officers: Deleplace (1987: 116) claimed that contrary to accounts ‘from above’ of the 
policing of Mai, such as Grimaud’s memoir, orders to wait and watch were widely disobeyed 
by the rank and file. He even suggests that charges were sometimes used as cover to violently 
settle scores with commanders who were disliked (116). There were reports of a unit of CRS 
dispersing in panic on 6th May while its commander turned his matraque on fleeing 
subordinates and of another charging in defiance of orders on 10th May, leading anxious 
commanders to tell those involved to empty their firearms (Joffrin, 2008: 101, 144). 
Moreover, ‘De temps en temps, on réglait le problème nous-mêmes, parce que ces pavés qui 
prenaient l’ascenseur ou l’escalier, cela ne nous plaisait vraiment pas. Deux, trois coups de 
poing s’échangaeint et les pavés ne montaient pas!’ (Deleplace, 1987: 118). Gaveau is clear 
that the officers he commanded frequently disobeyed orders: ‘les policiers se mettent tout à 
coup à répliquer en renvoyant à leurs expéditeurs pavés et pierres […] même si le 
commandement interdit la riposte, les hommes, furieux, passent outre, invoquant, non sans 
raison, la légitime défense.’ (Gaveau, 1978: 38) For the GM, Forest (2011: 169) offers a 
similarly nonchalant account of assaults conducted by men under his command on protestors 
apprehended in the early hours with hands dirty from lifting pavés: ‘Ceux qui sont 
appréhendés à ces heures-là et qui ont les mains sales, sont souvent giflés et bousculés.’  
It is difficult to judge exactly how widespread such violent disobedience was by 
police officers during the Mai protests. In the sample of the Paris police archives for Mai 
which I consulted (PP FB 4, FB 11 and FB 29) there is not a single mention of 
insubordination, although as Gareth Bordelais (2011: 158–9) also noticed in his 
comprehensive reading of these archives, in reports by more senior officers there are 
occasinally vague allusions to ‘une gestion relativement difficile de leurs subordonnés à 
certains moments, notamment pendant la phase d’attente’. Yet in writings of their own, 
published between eleven and forty-three years afterwards, the fact that three commanders 
(Gaveau, Clémençon and Forest) of varied political persuasions covering a variety of types of 
unit, and one rank-and-file officer (Deleplace), not only acknowledge but justify and excuse 
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widespread violence in defiance of orders, as well as other relatively inconsequential forms 
of insubordination, strongly suggests that policing on the ground was far more disorderly and 
brutal than more serene top-down accounts admitted (especially Grimaud, 1977 and 2007). 
Xavier Vigna (2007) has shown how a culture of insubordination developed among factory 
workers during les années 68: it is more surprising that such a culture also developed within 
the police, even though those official archives made available for consultation bear almost no 
trace of it.   
As well as in both trivial and violent insubordination, Clémençon indicates that some 
police units on the ground found comfort in more clandestine circumvention of Grimaud’s 
orders by turning a blind eye to guerilla attacks on protestors by units of le Service d’action 
civique (SAC), a service d’ordre founded in 1960 to support De Gaulle which, among more 
dubious activities, provided security for Gaullist political meetings and election campaigning 
before being disbanded by Mitterrand after members were implicated in a shooting in 1982: 
 
Des individus incontrôlés se faisaient à l’occasion passer pour des policiers, d’où 
certaines méprises dans l’esprit du public témoin des faits. Dans ce climat de franche 
confusion où l’autorité de l’État était absente, les responsables du service d’ordre 
fermaient les yeux car ces actions, certes illégales, permettaient de réduire la pression 
des groupes extrémistes de gauche qui harcelaient violemment les forces d’ordre. 
(Clémençon, 1999: 58) 
 
Daniel Gordon (2007: 113) has drawn attention to evidence in police archives of extensive 
and mainly nocturnal violence by SAC members in support of Gaullist candidates in the June 
election campaign, including the occasional use of firearms; the organisational role of the 
SAC alongside the Comités pour la défense de la République (CDRs), operating out of the 
same building on Rue de Solférino, in organising the 30th May Gaullist counter-
demonstration has also been discussed (Georgi, 1995). However, Clémençon’s claim is 
altogether more sinister: having largely lost their customary interlocutors and functional 
auxiliaries, police sought to relieve the pressure on themselves (‘réduire la pression’) by 
tacitly co-operating with an armed militia. This lends credence to an account by former SAC 
member Gilbert Lecavelier (Lecavelier and Ferrand, 1982), questionable to the extent that he 
was later imprisoned for fraud but largely endorsed as accurate in its detail on Mai in 
François Audigier’s (2003) study of the SAC. According to Lecavelier (1982: 25) and 
Audigier (2003: 123), some 150 personnel drawn mainly from SAC militants but also from 
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veteran soldiers close to the OAS, far-right factions and career criminals, were formed into 
three brigades under the command of a sometime bodyguard of De Gaulle’s, who directed 
them by radio from HQ at Rue de Solférino.6 These units armed with telescopic batons and 
grenades would approach barricades while shouting gauchiste slogans before attacking 
protestors and breaching the barricade. According to Audigier (2003: 125), protestors were 
taken prisoner and brought back to headquarters in fake Red Cross ambulances for 
interrogation in the cellars about their leaders and objectives.7 Audigier (2003: 128) further 
claims that the level of violence employed by the SAC led to objections from some police 
commanders, such that the last time the SAC brigades were officially deployed on combat 
operations in May was on the first Nuit des barricades, 10th–11th. Audigier (2003: 127) 
alleges that Fouchet and Grimaud knew and disapproved of the SAC’s work although 
Grimaud’s first mention of activities of a similar nature by the SAC is a fleeting allusion not 
published until 2007 to ‘opérations scabreuses, genre S.A.C.’ in a diary entry for 10th July 
(Grimaud, 2007: 358).  
 The sudden doubling, or tripling, of SAC membership in 1968 (Assemblée Nationale, 
1982) included significant numbers of the militant far-right, in line with a wider reactive 
consolidation of ‘le gaullisme d’ordre’ (Audigier, 2012), perhaps most striking for its 
reintegration of those who had deserted The General over Algeria (Gaïti, 2008: 265; 
Shephard, 2011; Georgi, 1995).8 Jacques Foccart’s journal gives little away about the exact 
extent of his own involvement in furthering this radicalising reaction, but he does 
acknowledge that the SAC saw him as their ‘patron’ and comments in relation to news that 
its militants had opened fire in La Rochelle on 18th June that ‘je sais que le Service d’action 
civique et les opérations de maintien de l’ordre que je mène ne plaisent pas à tout le monde’ 
(Foccart, 1998: 220, emphasis added). This is an acknowledgement of his semi-clandestine 
role heading the SAC as chief of a parallel police, even though at the 1982 inquiry he denied 
categorically having ever been in charge of the SAC and rejected claims that it constituted 
such an auxiliary force. Arguably, its relationship with the police was rather more intimate 
than merely parallel: the inquiry estimated that 10–15% of SAC members were salaried 
members of the Police Nationale (Assemblée Nationale, 1982: 147). He also reveals (Foccart, 
1998: 139, 144) two telephone conversations with Pierre Messmer, armed forces minister, in 
which he requested and presumably obtained fuel tokens for the SAC, indicating that this 
group was functioning as an auxiliary or extrusion of the state apparatus. Foccart (1998: 128) 
records receiving two OAS-sympathising officer acquaintances on 24th May for the first time 
since 1961, who offered the services of a group of ‘anciens commandos’. He claims he 
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responded by reminding them that it was important not to intervene in a way that risked 
precipitating civil war but that ‘En tant que citoyens, ils peuvent faire ce qu’ils veulent, mais 
qu’ils ne se fassent pas prendre dans des manifestations’ (Foccart, 1998: 128). This was 
anything but an invitation to stay at home. Two of those arrested on 24th May had a criminal 
record for involvement with the OAS and archives suggest that two card-carrying Gaullists 
were probably arrested on the following day (PP FB 11).9 Foccart, who by mid-May was 
barely sleeping and sustained by amphetamines, was in fact actively preparing for an armed 
resolution of the conflict by SAC militia units working alongside the army (Audigier, 2003: 
136–7): if the salaried police could not restore order then a novel configuration of the 
regime’s repressive forces would, if need be, undertake the ‘action civique’ De Gaulle spoke 
of in his second address to the nation, on 30th May (Joffrin, 2008: 353).10 The brutal 
interventions by clandestine SAC units alongside the police at the beginning of the month 
rehearsed an altogether bloodier counter-revolutionary end game.  
While the full extent and precise nature of the auxiliary policing role played by SAC 
guerilla units in Mai is difficult to determine from the sources I have consulted, there is one 
sequence of incidents ‘d’une brutalité inouïe et parfaitement inutile’ involving gas grenades 
in the early hours of 8th May which can probably be attributed to these units rather than to the 
‘policiers surexcités’ who have hitherto been blamed (Viansson-Ponté, 1971: 450). On 8th 
May AFP reported that at 2am a series of cafés in Montparnasse had been attacked by police 
who smashed windows and threw in tear gas grenades, assaulting choking customers as they 
emerged for air. Lecavelier (1982: 28) boasted of having been on Boulevard Montparnasse 
with his SAC unit around 2am: ‘Là aussi, nous assurons quelques prises parmi les meneurs 
gauchistes, en n’hésitant pas à briser les portes vitrées d’un café dont le patron s’est avisé de 
vouloir protéger des manifestants, puis en jetant des lacrymos spéciales à l’intérieur.’ He also 
described these ‘special’ grenades, collected from the armoury at Rue de Solférino: ‘La 
police n’a d’ailleurs pas le droit de les utiliser à cause du fort pourcentage de chlore qu’elles 
contiennent.’ (Lecavelier, 1982: 25) That same evening a doctor from the Hôpital Cochin had 
telephoned the Préfecture demanding to know the chemical composition of the tear gas used 
by police and was told they contained ethyl bromoacetate (PP FB 4). Asked at what 
percentage, the police telephone operator initially said that their Service Technique did not 
know, ringing the exasperated doctor back twenty-five minutes later only to add that ‘la 
composition peut être variable’. The precise nature and composition of the gas used in the 
grenades was a promient theme in anti-police activism: a tract seized on 9th May denounced 
the use of ‘des gaz de combat utilisés au Vietnam par les Américains’ (PP FB 4), showing 
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how alignments of repressive technique could be used politically to gesture to an 
international convergence of emancipatory struggles. Dr Marcel-Francis Kahn, a doctor at the 
Hôpital Saint-Antoine, lent medical credence to these rumours while also referencing another 
arena of struggle against American imperialism: the police, he said at a press conference, 
were using a new type of toxic gas, ‘dérivé du gaz américain “brouillard-apathie” employé 
dans les manifestations raciales’ (Journal du Dimanche, 12 May 1968; see also Le Goff, 
2006: 108). The toxicology clinic at Fernand Vidal hospital offered free and anonymous 
examinations to anyone exposed to gas during demonstrations (PP FB 29, undated). Grimaud 
tried hard to counter these rumours and bemoaned their influence on credulous young ears 
(Grimaud, 1977: 176). Yet the extent of Grimaud’s initial investigation of the matter involved 
summoning a Professor Chovin, who assured him that all of the grenades in use came from 
the same state supplier whose probity was beyond question (Grimaud, 1977: 162–3). 
However, if Lecavelier, the customers of those Montparnasse cafés and the anti-police 
activists with their empirical evidence were to be believed then there were other types of gas 
grenade in use in addition those officially authorised. Moreover, not all of Grimaud’s officers 
shared his credulous confidence: a commander’s report from the night of 7th–8th May refers to 
two tear gas grenades ‘du type G.R. CND. 3AC X 63 et CB. 10 AC X 66’, found on the 
street, being sent to the lab for analysis (PP FB 4). Given the precision with which these 
objects are identified as police grenades, the most likely reason to send them for analysis was 
that there were doubts as to the composition of their contents. Although protestors’ 
allegations and Grimaud’s rebuttals (as well as some subsequent discussion, for example 
Rajsfus, 1998: 26) fixated on the chemical composition and the classification of the gas – 
whether they were, or not, gaz de combat/guerre – the degree of danger posed by the 
weapons also depended to a large extent on how and where they were used.11  
 It would be misleading to suggest that the SAC’s guerilla operations were decisive in 
the regime’s victory and there is usually reason to be cautious before conspiracy-theorising 
about agents provocateurs (Brunet, 1990).12 Yet Clémençon’s account, in particular, suggests 
that policing on the ground in Mai was significantly more complex, violent and disorderly 
than Grimaud and those who have lionised him (Lajus, 2008; Nivet, 2015) suggest; 
moreover, it implies that some police found comfort in the violence of these auxiliaries, 
particularly in the early days. It also seems likely that Foccart (1998: 114), exasperated by 
rumours that demoralised police could not be relied on to restore order, was planning a new 
configuration of repressive forces. Grimaud, meanwhile, was attempting to boost police 
morale by more constitutionally conventional means, with what was in effect a significant 
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pay rise backdated to 1st January. The police were thus the first workers in France to benefit 
economically from Mai, even though the government went to some lengths to disguise the 
fact that this was a pay rise by using a relatively obscure bureaucratic instrument.13 To have 
more openly raised police pay would have signalled that the regime felt it needed to buy the 
loyalty of its mercenaries. 
No less significant a factor in the regime’s ultimate survival than the nature of the 
units, weapons and tactics employed by the police and their auxiliaries was the exercise of 
(in)security governance over the wider population. A communications operation gradually 
disseminated police ways of knowing protestors through the media into the population. These 
ways of knowing were those characteristic of police work, in which suspicion of people’s 
motives and fear of risky outcomes are paramount (Jobard and De Maillard, 2015: 101). Ross 
(2002) has shown eloquently how ‘the logic of the police’ performed individualising work by 
isolating protestors into sociological categories such as ‘students’ and ‘workers’, how it 
spread well beyond the police as state institution and even influenced the historiography and 
memory of Mai. Ross’s elegant Rancierian argument is that such an approach to Mai is a 
distortion of its political meaning as ‘a crisis in functionalism’ and a series of ‘experiments in 
declassification, in disrupting the natural “givenness” of places’ (Ross, 2002: 25). Police 
records of arrests indeed distinguish systematically between ‘étudiants’ and ‘non-étudiants’, 
at the request of the Ministère de l’Intérieur: ‘La catégorisation administrative montre à quel 
point ces rencontres improbables, ce mélange social, paraissaient incongrus et dérangeaient’ 
(Zancarini-Fournel, 2008: 67). 
Among other divisive police ways of knowing, which it could be argued analogously 
traduced the declassifying politics of Mai, are distinctions between ‘meneurs’ and ‘suiveurs’ 
(Fillieule, 1997: 313) and between peaceful protestors with legitimate grievances and 
‘casseurs’, demonstrators thus classified because they use violence against police or 
property.14 However, I wish to focus instead on another category of police knowledge which 
flourished during May to incite fear among protestors, police and the wider population: the 
‘loubard’, ‘voyou’, or ‘loulou’ in the quaintly familiar compound favoured by police 
(Grimaud, 1977: 248) and Cohn-Bendit (1978: 39) alike. The presence of such ‘loulous’, or 
‘loulous de banlieue’ (Gaveau, 1978: 103), among demonstrators – violent criminal elements 
who wanted to fight the police – increasingly preoccupied officers. In a report from the 
commander charged with clearing Place de la Bourse on 24th May, there is even a reference 
to ‘de “jeunes voyous” parfaitement encadrés et dirigés’ (PP FB 11): organised thuggery, 
which begins to sound uncannily like policing. The figure of the ‘loulou’, or ‘voyou’, 
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designating violent extraneous elements representing a danger to the entire population, was 
elaborated in Christian Fouchet’s radio interview at 3.30am the following morning, in which 
he referred to ‘la pègre sortie des bas-fonds de la capitale, véritablement enragée, qui se 
dissimule derrière les étudiants’, a rhetorical move widely considered crucial in turning 
public opinion against the protestors (Forest, 2011: 170; Viansson-Ponté, 1971: 508; Ross, 
2002: 108; Zancarini-Fournel, 2016: 822). This interview and the repetition of the term in the 
edition of L’Humanité the following day was a highly effective act of (in)security governance 
over the wider population, one which coincided with the insecurity strategy Pompidou owned 
up to in his memoirs, of allowing the demonstration to disperse violently in central Paris in 
order to terrorise ordinary middle-class Parisians. The divisive figure of the ‘loulou’, as 
extended into ‘la pègre’ by Fouchet and as subsumed soon thereafter by Marcellin into the 
‘casseur’, was also divisive for the communist and revolutionary left. For neither had yet 
worked through Marx’s partage between proletariat and lumpenproletariat, one which had 
compliantly accepted nineteenth century governing elites’ self-serving dramatisation of the 
terrifying figure of the criminal, intended to drive forward in tandem their institutionalisation 
of the police and their consolidation of absolute private property rights (Perrot, 1980: 287; 
Foucault, 2013). 
The regime learned during May that the most effective way to win public support is to 
encourage the population to think, feel and know the world as the police do: divisively, 
suspiciously and fearfully. The sudden breakdown of customarily cosy relationships with 
protestors’ services d’ordre revealed how dependent the police usually were on the co-
operation of those they policed. Forced out on to the streets in large numbers, the police and 
their behaviour became spectacle and numerous incidents of brutality supplied fuel for the 
very protests officers were supposed to be suppressing. Although Grimaud was undoubtedly 
also motivated by humanitarian concerns, he judged that the survival of the regime depended 
on managing the fear and panic of his own officers, in particular by massing them into large 
enough units before intervening. However, unanticipated consequences of this ‘attentisme’ 
included what I have reconstructed in this article as the humiliating experience of various 
forms of acute existential-professional and material-practical unease. In the face of such 
insecurity some police sought comfort in the early days from the clandestine activities of a 
violent militia and throughout the month Grimaud’s explicit orders to show restraint were 
widely ignored on the ground by the rank-and-file, for whom commanders were all too 
willing to make excuses. Yet it was the dissemination of police forms of knowing into the 
wider population which ultimately alienated it from the protestors: the population was 
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allowed to experience just enough terror to bring them back to support the regime and its 
frontline functionaries. Although Mai ended Alain Peyrefitte’s tenure as education minister, 
his 1976 Comité d’études sur la violence, la criminalité et la délinquance would later define 
the affective horizon of contemporary France’s (in)security society by placing the 
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1 Except where finer distinctions are pertinent, I use the term ‘the police’ (and cognates) to 
refer to members of all three of les forces de l’ordre as constituted in 1968, namely the 
municipal police, CRS and Gendarmerie Mobile (GM). 
2 Indeed, very occasionally the expression ‘le service d’ordre’ is also used to refer to the 
police (e.g. Clémençon, 1999: 58). 
3 The expression ‘le service d’ordre’ refers here, unusually, to the police. See also n. 2, 
above. 
4 Kristin Ross (2002: 37) mistakes this last exception for the rule in a misleading definition of 
services d’ordre as ‘small groups specialized in physical street combat with the police, or 
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with far-right groups like Occident, Ordre Nouveau, or Jeune Nation’. Pace Ross (2002: 25), 
it is not surprising that during the factory strikes and occupations trade union SOs carried out 
auxiliary policing work, in her extended sense, by excluding students who marched to join 
the factory workers, turning them away at the gates of Billancourt and Flins, since this was 
entirely consistent with their customary role in policing demonstrations by excluding those 
not deemed to belong there.  
5 See also pp. 77-8. Mai figures very prominently in Maintenant (Comité invisible, 2017), so 
much so that it may not be too fanciful to see in the title a projection of Mai into the now. 
The book advances a radical theory of the convergence of anti-capitalist emancipatory 
struggles today around militant anti-police activism. Mai is characterised as a ‘destituant’ 
insurrection (Comité invisible, 2017: 74), by contrast with the ‘constituant’ aspirations of 
Nuit Debout.     
6 Charpier (2005: 166) suggests Lecavelier had a more prominent organising role and that his 
liaising between the SAC and the far right, including members of Occident and returning 
mercenaries, was done with the approval of a representative of the Ministère de l’Intérieur. 
7 The pressure brought to bear during these interrogations was, Audigier (2003: 125) asserts, 
more a matter of psychological terror than physical brutality. This first use of fake 
ambulances is ironic given all of the fuss made by Grimaud later in the month about 
protestors using fake ambulances to transport weapons: Operation Zig-Zag institued on 25th 
May involved searching all vehicles purporting to belong to the Red Cross (PP FB 29).   
8 Jacques Foccart recalled Pierre Debizet from Gabon to lead the SAC in May 1968, sending 
a signal to other OAS sympathisers that their return was welcome if they could contribute a 
similarly muscular defence of the regime (Péan, 1990: 365). He also masterminded the 
creation of the CDRs to lure back those nationalists for whom the SAC was too tainted by its 
past defence of De Gaulle in his pursuit of Algerian independence (Pozzi, 2009: 67). The 
release of Salan and Argoud on June 18th and the amnesty of OAS exiles including Bidault 
and Soustelle, possibly demanded or recommended by Massu (Shephard, 2011: 78), also 
helped draw the Right back together by reintegrating more radical elements.     
9 ‘Probably’ because the handwritten note about two of those arrested and taken to Beaujon, 
which refers to a ‘Carte Association des Français Libres’ and a ‘Membre du Comité de 
Soutien au Général de Gaulle’, is dated 25/4/68, which I think is probably a mistake and 
indeed it is included with the material in the box for 24th–25th May. 
10 In 1974 Libération published what purported to be an internal SAC memorandum detailing 
plans to intern around 50,000 left-wing activists in stadia across France (Mathieu, 2013: 148). 
Audigier (2003: 155) argues that the note was probably authentic because the government or 
SAC could have sued for defamation but chose not to.  
11 Grenades were also used in the confined space of François Maspero’s bookshop, La Joie de 
Lire, on 6th May: there is a report (PP FB 4) of Madame Maspero demanding a toxicological 
analysis of the gas in police grenades. Corrosive liquid probably from grenades could also be 
used by police to cause severe burns to the genitals, as in the case of a sixteen year-old 
identified as an apprencie baker by Le Canard enchaîné (17 July 1968) and by police in their 
own arrest record as an electrician, where they misleadingly refer merely to ‘brûlures par 
acide’ (PP FB 11).  
12 That said, although Brunet (1990) gently mocks them with urbane derision, in my view he 
does not persuasively refute allegations that SAC detachments were involved as agents 
provocateurs working in connivence with the Paris police on 5 June 1971 and 23 March 
1979. See also Hamon and Marchand, 1983: 193–96. 
13 A note to police sent by Grimaud on 13th May explained the complex instrument used to 
award this pay rise: ‘Je suis heureux de vous informer que le taux de l’indemnité de sujétions 
spéciales est majoré de trois points pour l’ensemble des personnels de police.’ (PP FB 4) 
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14 Marcellin’s loi “anti-casseurs” of 1970 gave legal meaning to this category by making 
organisers of demonstrations in which damage to property occurred criminally liable for it. 
The delegitimising police concept of the ‘casseur’ has been a particularly successful police 
legacy of les années 68 (Fillieule, 1997: 100; Dufresne, 2007: 27); the political basis of the 
conceptual distinction on which it rests has only recently been exposed to sustained critique 
(Comité invisible, 2017: 59).  
